Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he tax on corporate source income tax has declined signifi cantly in its importance as a source of revenue and in its marginal burden over the past half century, a trend that is continued in recent (albeit technically temporary) legislation enacted in 2002 and 2003 . A new corporate tax proposal currently under consideration would slightly reduce corporate taxes further and alter many features of the tax. Economists have long been critical of imposing high corporate taxes on investment income for effi ciency reasons (while recognizing that the tax is a source of revenue and may contribute to the progressivity of the tax system). This paper examines the path of past, present, and proposed changes to the corporate tax and considers the associated effi ciency effects.
The fi rst three sections of this paper trace the decline in the corporate tax, consider the reasons for that decline, and discuss whether these changes have been desirable from an effi ciency standpoint. The following two sections discuss, in turn, the temporary tax provisions (including individual rate reductions that affect relative tax burdens on corporate and noncorporate investments) enacted in [2001] [2002] [2003] and their effects on effi ciency and the proposed changes in the current corporate tax legislation.
THE DECLINE IN THE CORPORATE TAX
In 1953, corporate tax revenues made up 5.6 percent of output and accounted for almost 30 percent of total fed-eral revenues. By 2003, revenues from the corporate tax had fallen to 1.2 percent of output and accounted for seven percent of total federal revenues. The relative size of the tax, therefore, declined by about 75 percent. Table 1 shows the decline in corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP over the period . (Since total revenues have remained relatively constant as a percent of GDP, the decline in the corporate tax as a share of output is mirrored by the decline in the corporate tax's share of revenues.) The Congressional Budget Offi ce (2004) projects that these shares will increase slightly absent legislation extending current temporary provisions or the enactment of new measures. Revenues from the corporate tax should settle out at slightly under two percent of output, and about nine percent of current federal revenues.
By any measure, the corporate tax is a shadow of its former self. The same is not true of the individual income tax, which shows no obvious trend in revenues (although its current level of 7.3 percent of output is below its typical level of slightly over eight percent) or the payroll tax, which grew substantially through the postwar period until around the mid 1980s. Total federal revenues also show no obvious trend.
A similar pattern of decline can be seen in estimates of the effective marginal tax rate on new investment. The effective marginal tax rate measures the estimated tax burden on a new investment. The basic formula for calculating the effective tax rate is (r -R)/r, where r is the pre-tax return on a marginal investment, or internal discount rate for an investment subject to no taxes, and R is the after-tax discount rate that discounts all fl ows to the cost of the investment with taxes. (See Mackie (2002) and Gravelle (1994) for more detail on effective marginal tax rates.)
The third column of Table 2 reports the effective marginal tax rate from the point of view of the fi rm (i.e., not taking into account personal level taxes or debt fi nance, but simply refl ecting the corporate tax rate 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 5.6 5.5 4.3 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.2 3.3 3.9 3.2 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.8 2. 7 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.2 Source: Data for 1962 to present are taken from the Congressional Budget Offi ce (2004) . Data for earlier years are computed directly from the National Income and Products Accounts.
Year
Revenues as a Percent of GDP Year Revenues as a Percent of GDP and effects of depreciation and investment credits). Using a continuous time model, the relationship between r and R, with R the fi rm's discount rate, derived from an investment in a business asset that depreciates geometrically is:
[1] r = (R + δ)(1 -uz -k(1 -auz))
where u is the fi rm's statutory tax rate (in this case, the corporate statutory rate), U.S. Total 1953 U.S. Total 1954 U.S. Total 1955 U.S. Total 1956 U.S. Total 1957 U.S. Total 1958 U.S. Total 1959 U.S. Total 1960 U.S. Total 1961 U.S. Total 1962 U.S. Total 1963 U.S. Total 1964 U.S. Total 1965 U.S. Total 1966 U.S. Total 1967 U.S. Total 1968 U.S. Total 1969 U.S. Total 1970 U.S. Total 1971 U.S. Total 1972 U.S. Total 1973 U.S. Total 1974 U.S. Total 1975 U.S. Total 1976 U.S. Total 1977 U.S. Total 1978 U.S. Total 1979 U.S. Total 1980 U.S. Total 1981 U.S. Total 1982 U.S. Total 1983 U.S. Total 1984 U.S. Total 1985 U.S. Total 1986 U.S. Total 1987 U.S. Total 1988 U.S. Total 1989 U.S. Total 1990 U.S. Total 1991 U.S. Total 1992 U.S. Total 1993 U.S. Total 1994 U.S. Total 1995 U.S. Total 1996 U.S. Total 1997 U.S. Total 1998 U.S. Total 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003   52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  50  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  46  46  46  46  46  46  46  46  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35   63  50  51  53  55  55  52  49  49  42  41  38  37  37  40  44  52  48  43  44  43  48  51  46  41  50  47  51  37  35  39  38  38  38  35  35  34  33  32  32  33  32  32  32  31  31  30  31  32  30  27   70  57  58  60  61  61  58  55  55  48  47  44  42  42  45  50  58  54  50  51  51  55  56  53  49  58  57  60  48  43  46  44  44  45  44  43  43  42  41  41  42  41  42  42  41  41  40  41  41  39  32   37  23  24  25  27  26  25  23  22  17  16  14  13  14  17  20  28  26  21  21  21  25  27  23  23  26  29  33  24  22  20  20  20  19  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  23  22  23  23  22  21  18   -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  3  5  5  5  5  5  7  11  7  6  10  11  15  12  9  8  7  7  6  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   58  43  44  46  48  47  45  42  42  35  34  31  29  30  33  37  45  42  38  38  38  42  44  40  40  46  45  48  38  35  34  33  33  33  33  33  33  31  30  30  31  30  31  31  31  30  30  31  30  29  23  Source : See text and appendix for method of calculation and assumptions. OwnerOccupied δ is the economic depreciation rate, z is the present discounted value of depreciation deductions, k is the investment tax credit, and a is a determinant of the basis adjustment, set at one, 0.5, and zero if there is a full basis adjustment (i.e., depreciation allowed only on cost net of the credit), half basis adjustment (i.e., depreciation allowed only on cost net of half the credit), or no basis adjustment (i.e., depreciation allowed on the full purchase price, respectively). This measure estimates the share of the total return that is collected in taxes and accounts for the timing of tax payments as well as their size. (Assumptions are provided in the appendix.)
The difference between the effective tax rate reported in the third column and the statutory tax rate reported in the second column refl ects the magnitude of tax benefi ts or penalties granted through depreciation policy and the tax benefi ts associated with investment subsidies. Using equation [1] , if the present value of depreciation deductions, z, is set to economic depreciation, δ/(R + δ), and there is no investment credit (k = zero), the pre-tax return, r, is R/(1 -u) and the effective tax rate is the statutory rate. Effective marginal tax rates on investment projects can be compared directly with corporate statutory tax rates, which fell from 52 percent in 1953 to 35 percent in 2003. In 1953 the effective tax rate was 63 percent (11 percentage points above the statutory rate); by 2003, 50 years later, the rate was 27 percent (eight percentage points below the statutory rate). Overall, the effective tax rate declined by two thirds.
The decline in the marginal corporate effective rate cannot be considered in isolation for our subsequent examination of effi ciency issues. Effi ciency analyses must account for the role of debt fi nance. The use of debt fi nance narrows the differential between the total tax on corporate capital and the total tax on non-corporate capital since debt is treated similarly in both sectors. (At the same time, however, the difference in the tax treatment of debt versus equity introduces a new distortion, in fi nancing choice.) Tax differentials between the sectors must also account for the lower effective individual tax rates that typically apply to corporate source income (usually because of preferential treatment of capital gains) as well as the interaction between the corporate and individual tax (i.e., because the individual tax is imposed on net-of-corporate-tax profi ts, the corporate tax is effectively deducted from the individual base). Because of the role of individual taxes, ordinary rate cuts, such as those that were enacted in 2001, widen the differentials between taxes on corporate and noncorporate investment (and between debt and equity fi nance).
The remaining columns of Table 2 compute total marginal effective tax rates for the corporate sector, unincorporated businesses, and owner-occupied housing. The total marginal effective tax rates in columns 4 through 7 is measured by the difference between the pre-tax return on the investment and the after-tax return to the individual supplier of capital, divided by the pre-tax return. This rate takes account of individual and, for the corporate sector, corporate statutory tax rates, use of debt, timing of taxes, and preferences. The formula in [1] is applied to obtain fi rmlevel tax rates (the fi rm-level corporate rate in column 3 and the non-corporate rate in column 5), with R a weighted average of the after-tax real interest rate (i(1 -u) -π) where i is the interest rate and π is the infl ation rate) and the required real return on equity before individual tax. (One third of the investment is assumed to be fi nanced with debt.) In the case of total corporate tax rates in column 4, the pre-tax return, r, is derived from equation [1] but is compared with the return after personal taxes to individuals (the same discount rate used for non-corporate business), a weighted average of the after-tax real return on debt (i(1 -t) -π), where t is the individual tax rate, and the after-tax return on corporate equity (which is net of taxes on capital gains and dividends).
The tax rate for owner-occupied housing omits the effect of depreciation and taxes on profit. The pre-tax return is simply R + f(1 -n)t -ntp, where f is the debt share, n is the share of investments with individuals who itemize on their tax returns, p is the property tax rate, and R is the after-tax discount rate (the same after-tax discount rate used to measure non-corporate marginal tax rates). These data are from Gravelle (1994) . If all mortgage interest deductions but no property tax deductions were allowed, the tax rate would be zero because there is no tax on the imputed net rent. A slight positive or negative tax may arise because of the inability of non-itemizers to deduct mortgage interest and the ability of itemizers to deduct property taxes.
The fi gures in Table 2 show that the total tax rate on corporate sector investment was 70 percent in 1953 and fell to 32 percent by 2003, a decline of 54 percent. The tax rate on unincorporated businesses fell by 51. In contrast, the tax rate on owner-occupied housing investment stayed roughly around zero. Overall, the tax rate fell from 58 to 23 percent, a decline of 60 percent.
The effective marginal tax rates presented in Table 2 may understate the fall in average tax rates over this period, as well as their level, since they do not take into account the increasing share of individual passive capital income realized by individuals in tax exempt form, mainly through pension plans and individual retirement accounts. These investments may often not affect some tax margins (because they are subject to ceilings and may affect investment at the margin), but they do reduce revenues (although in this case, revenues from the individual income tax). If these investments were considered the marginal source of funds in proportion to the share of assets in tax favored accounts (assuming about half of interest, dividends and capital gains are not taxed), the total effective marginal tax rate shown in the last column of What led to these changes in the corporate sector's decline in revenue as a fraction of GDP and the decline in marginal rates, both absolute and relative to the effective rates on unincorporated businesses and owner-occupied housing? Are the changes desirable from an effi ciency standpoint? And where is the tax likely to be headed?
WHY DID CORPORATE TAX RATES AND REVENUES FALL?
As shown in Table 1 , the fall in corporate revenues as a percent of GDP was relatively steady through the early 1980s with shares falling to four percent in the 1960s and 2.4 percent by 1980. The low point for corporate tax revenues, 1.1 percent of output, was reached in 1983, refl ecting both the recession and the growing depreciation deductions from the 1981 depreciation liberalization. Since then, the share rose and then declined, until it reached its current low of 1.2 percent in 2003. Notice that the marginal tax rate pattern in column 3 of Table 2 also shows a low point in the mid-1980s and in 2003, although the patterns are somewhat different.
The decline in the corporate tax share occurred even though the corporate sector might have been expected to grow in importance relative to the noncorporate sector as the economy's output increasingly tended to be provided by large fi rms over this period. Indeed, according to the National Income and Product accounts, the corporate share of total fi xed assets in the economy had risen by 12 percent since 1953.
Tax Law Changes: Rate Reductions and Depreciation Changes
Changes in rates and in capital cost recovery were important contributors to the decline in the corporate tax share of revenues. As shown in Table 2 More generous depreciation rules, which allow costs of equipment and buildings to be deducted more quickly, have also contributed to the decline in corporate taxes, particularly in eras of relatively low infl ation. How changes in depreciation policy can affect the pattern of effective tax burdens is perhaps most easily seen using the marginal tax rates in Table 2 . Accelerated depreciation methods enacted in 1954 which allowed double declining balance or sum-of-years-digits methods brought effective and statutory rates quite close together (with an effective rate of 50 percent and a statutory rate of 52 percent). Depreciation was further liberalized in the early sixties, the early seventies, and the early eighties through shorter lives (although accelerated methods for structures were limited from the 1970s on). Investment credits ranging from seven to ten percent were also available during most years from 1962 on until their repeal in 1986. (See Gravelle (1994) for a more complete history.) The rescinding of the investment credit in 1986 largely offset the effect of rate reductions on marginal effective tax rates (and depreciation was made less generous as well, with a further lengthening of lives in 1993). Bonus depreciation, which allowed a fraction of investment to be deducted immediately, was adopted in 2002 and expanded in 2003.
Effective tax rates, particularly for the corporate tax alone, are affected by infl ation rates. Infl ation reduces the present value of depreciation as it pushes up nominal interest rates; thus, as infl ation rose in the late sixties and seventies, effective tax rates were pushed up, other things equal; the fall in infl ation in the eighties and nineties had the opposite effect. (See Gravelle (1994) , Mackie (2002) , and Gravelle (2001) for discussions of the interaction of infl ation with depreciation allowances.) However, if we compare the endpoints of 1953 and 2003, both periods when infl ation was relatively low and at about the same level, it is clear that both accelerated depreciation and rate reductions played a role in reducing marginal effective tax rates. Since the tax calculations in Table 2 refl ect only those major provisions of law discussed above, it appears that statutory rates (which fell from 52 to 35 percent, or by about a third) accounted for about half of the 57 percent decline in marginal effective tax rates (from 63 to 27 percent), and more generous depreciation for the remainder.
Depreciation liberalization is probably less important in explaining the decline in revenues because depreciation benefi ts are a matter of timing. After all vintages of assets are fi nally covered under a depreciation change, depreciation deductions may vary relatively little between a relatively slow and a relatively fast depreciation system, because the larger deductions for newer vintages of assets are partly offset by the smaller deduction for older vintages. (With no nominal growth in investment, any depreciation system eventually produces identical deductions.) Depreciation liberalization can cause a signifi cant and initially-growing short-term decline in revenues (as in the early 1980s), however.
The current low level of corporate tax receipts refl ects the recent adoption and expansion of bonus depreciation, a form of accelerated depreciation where a fraction of investment (initially 30 percent in 2002 and expanded to 50 percent in 2003) is deducted when incurred. These tax benefi ts arise largely from timing, and so tend to exaggerate the shifts in corporate tax revenues. The same phenomenon occurred in the early 1980s when the accelerated depreciation enacted in 1981 began to accumulate. Cash fl ow measures can be extremely sensitive to timing, while effective marginal tax rates are more sensitive to legislative changes. In this sense, the marginal tax rates on new investment more accurately capture the effects of tax changes on investment and economic effi ciency. Table 2 captures only tax provisions that are built into marginal tax rate calculations (statutory rates, investment tax credits, and capital cost recovery). However, the decline in revenues reflects other factors as well, including increasing use of "self-help" tax integration techniques. "Self-help" integration occurs when a corporation recharacterizes itself as an unincorporated business for tax purposes while maintaining the non-tax benefi ts of incorporation (such as limited liability). Such fi rms can signifi cantly reduce taxes by being subject only to the individual level of taxes. A variety of techniques exist to accomplish this purpose.
Subchapter S Corporations
The most important approach is through a Subchapter S corporation, a fi rm that can elect to be taxed as a partnership. The main restriction on this activity is that the number of shareholders/partners is limited. Subchapter S corporations accounted for an estimated $175 billion of corporate profi ts in 2000 (1.8 percent of GDP) compared to virtually no share in 1980. This growth was made possible by the expansion in the number of partners permitted. The Subchapter S provisions originally enacted in 1958 permitted no more than ten shareholders. This number was expanded to 35 in 1982 and to 75 in 1996. The growth of Subchapter S corporations could account for ten percent or more of the reduction in corporate tax receipts, based on the estimated taxes that would have been paid on these profi ts. At the top marginal tax rate of 35 percent, 1.8 percent of GDP in Subchapter S profi ts would have yielded corporate tax revenues of 0.63 percent of GDP, which is about 14 percent of the change from 5.6 to 1.2 percent in corporate revenues as a percent of GDP over the period.
Other methods of avoiding the corporate tax while allowing many of the benefi ts of incorporation have appeared over this period as well. One relatively modern development is the Limited Liability Corporation, created by state law (Wyoming fi rst adopted such a law in 1977, Florida followed in 1982, and all states had such laws by the mid 1990s). These structures are designed to fail the IRS's tests of whether the fi rm is a corporation. These fi rms benefi t from unlimited partnership numbers but partners may be subject to self-employment taxes-we have yet to see how important these fi rms will become.
Tax Shelters
One potential reason for the decline in corporate tax receipts as a percent of GDP is increased corporate reliance on debt. However, another is increased use of tax shelters, especially for multinational corporations, and this factor is likely of more importance now than in the early fi fties.
One approach to estimating the effect of tax shelters on corporate revenues is to compare income reported to the tax authorities with income reported to shareholders. Tax shelters are most advantageous to corporations when these activities reduce taxable income without reducing fi nancial (book) income. Several studies comparing book and tax income have noted the widening gap between the two that cannot be explained by the traditional measures of depreciation, stock options, and foreign-source income retained abroad. To illustrate the potential magnitude of the effect of tax shelters in reducing corporate tax revenues, consider the study by Desai (2002) which found $155 billion of unexplained discrepancies between book and tax income in 1998, implying lost taxes of $55 billion at a 35 percent tax rate. This amount is probably somewhat lower than $55 billion because some fi rms are operating at a tax loss, some fi rms do not pay the top marginal tax rate, and some firms have unused credits. But the potential amount of foregone revenue that could refl ect the effects of tax shelters is signifi cant.
The erosion of the corporate base (for corporations other than Subchapter S corporations) could arise from intended tax preferences, however. Examining tax expenditures-which measure the revenue cost of explicit special tax deductions, exclusions, and credits not considered to be part of a normal income tax-may help provide some notion of the magnitude of intended versus unintended tax reductions.
In the same year that Desai (2002) estimated a $155 billion gap between book income (income reported to stockholders) and taxable income that could not otherwise be accounted for, and that could refl ect revenue losses of up to $55 billion, the projected tax expenditures for corporations were about $72 billion. Almost half of this amount ($33.5 billion) was due to accelerated depreciation, largely for equipment (and including expensing of research and development), which Desai (2002) accounted for in his calculation. Another $1.2 billion, also accounted for in Desai's (2002) measure, was retained earnings of controlled foreign corporations. If one also eliminates $2.5 billion for deductions of charitable contributions presumably deducted as a cost for book purposes, $4.2 billion lost because of graduated tax rates, and $7.6 billion of credits, the remaining tax expenditures account for about $23 billion, leaving up to $30 billion of revenues refl ecting the book/tax gap unexplained. While there are many uncertainties in calculating the unexplained differences in revenue based on book versus tax measures, there is nevertheless signifi cant scope for tax sheltering base reductions given the potential size of the book/tax difference discovered by Desai (2002) . Other indications of potentially signifi cant revenue loss from tax shelter transactions can be found in the revenue estimates for tax shelter provisions in current legislation, which include a gain of approximately four billion dollars in FY2005 for reforms related to a single tax shelter item: leasing transactions (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2004a and 2004b).
WAS THE INTENT TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE TAX?
Was the intent of tax policy over the past 50 years to reduce the role of the corporate tax in such a pronounced fashion? It is hard to fi nd evidence of such intent in the historical record. Corporate rate cuts and other changes that reduced corporate taxes seem to be associated with phenomena not directed at reducing the role of the corporate tax.
The first such phenomenon was the philosophy that whenever individual taxes are cut, corporate taxes should also be cut. Most legislation that cut taxes for individuals also cut taxes for corporations. The legislation providing the signifi cant individual tax cuts of 1964 and 1981, for example, also contained corporate tax cuts (in the fi rst case, a rate reduction and expansion of the investment credit and, in the second, accelerated depreciation). Corporate taxes were also cut along with individual taxes in the signifi cant individual tax reduction legislation of the mid and late 1970s, when infl ation rates were quite high, as well as in a number of smaller tax cuts (1954, 1969, 1971, and 1997) . The problem with this philosophy is that, during periods in which infl ation causes significant bracket creep (and even with current real bracket creep), the income tax will grow as a percentage of output unless tax cuts are periodically enacted. But the corporate rate, being largely a fl at rate, does not encounter this problem. Infl ation affects the corporate tax not through progressivity, which constantly pushes up the effective rate, but through measurement of the base mainly due to its effects on the present value of depreciation deductions. Adjusting the corporate tax for infl ation requires a one-time legislative change, which can correct for a given rate of infl ation. Keeping corporate taxes constant as a percent of output does not require continual adjustments for the price level. Indeed, given the current low rates of infl ation, accelerated depreciation methods currently lower the corporate rate more than is justifi ed by infl ation. This can be seen by the fact that the effective tax rate from the fi rm point of view which captures only statutory rates and capital cost recovery (column 3 of table 2) is 27 percent rather than 35 percent for 2003. Even without the bonus depreciation provision enacted in 2002 and expanded in 2003, the effective tax rate (at 32 percent in 2001) falls below the statutory rate.
The second phenomenon involves depreciation policy reform. There were three occasions over the last 50 years when the depreciation system was simplifi ed by either reducing the number of classes or allowing some safe harbors around the specified life. Two of these were accomplished (1962) or initially accomplished (1971) by regulation. Both of these changes, along with the 1981 change, also made depreciation more generous. Often multiple reasons are offered for revisions. In addition to simplifi cation, they may include an explicit objective of providing investment incentives which suggests a deliberate intent to lower tax burdens. Another reason for more generous depreciation might be to offset the effects of infl ation or increased obsolescence, an objective consistent with maintaining a fi xed tax rate. However, there is little tendency to make offsetting adjustments, for example, when infl ation falls. (See Gravelle (1994) for a more detailed discussion of the history of depreciation policy.)
Finally, some provisions were enacted for counter-cyclical purposes. For example, although the original investment credit was enacted as a permanent provision, it was suspended, restored, and increased as an economic stimulus. Most recently, the temporary bonus depreciation adopted in 2002 and expanded in 2003 was a counter-cyclical measure. Temporary provisions, however, have a way of becoming permanent, although the fate of bonus depreciation remains to be seen.
In sum, the declining role of the corporate tax as a source of revenue and the reduction in effective marginal tax rates has appeared to arise not from an explicit intent to minimize its importance but rather as a result of other factors.
HAVE THE SHIFTS IN TAX RATES BEEN DESIRABLE AS A MATTER OF TAX POLICY?
The reduction in the corporate tax rate, and in other tax rates, has led to some potentially important gains in effi ciency. The narrowing of the differential between effective marginal tax rates across investments reduces the tax wedge. The tax wedge is the increase in the required pre-tax return compared to an untaxed asset, and is measured as tR/(1 -t) , where t is the marginal effective tax rate and R is the after-tax required rate of return. For comparing corporate and noncorporate investment, the tax wedge differential is the difference in the tax wedges, and the deadweight loss from the misallocation of capital between those sectors is proportional to the square of the tax wedge differential. Assuming a fixed capital stock (i.e., that the weighted pretax return, which is R/(1 -t) in each sector, is fi xed), the tax rates in Table 2 imply that changes between 1953 and 2003 eliminated 93 percent of the deadweight loss from the misallocation of capital between corporate and noncorporate investment and 88 percent of the deadweight loss from misallocation of capital between corporations and owner-occupied housing. (Pre-tax returns were weighted at 0.5 for corporations, 0.2 for unincorporated businesses, and 0.3 for owner-occupied housing, based on estimates of their share of the capital stock from Gravelle (1994) to generate estimates of pre-tax returns over time given a fi xed capital stock). Thus, from an effi ciency standpoint, substantial gains were made in eliminating deadweight losses in the allocation of capital.
Any gains in effi ciency came at the cost of signifi cant lost revenues (as shown in Table 1 ) and, if one assumes that capital income taxes (including the corporate tax) largely fall on capital, reduced the progressivity of the tax system, all else equal. Progressivity and revenue can be obtained through other methods, however.
While the effective tax rates suggest that gains in effi ciency occurred, most of the tax changes were not explicitly aimed at narrowing the corporate/noncorporate distortion. Rate reductions via depreciation benefi t both noncorporate and corporate business, and investment credits are even more generous to unincorporated businesses that typically have lower marginal rates than corporate fi rms. Investment subsidies, including the current temporary bonus depreciation, also favor certain kinds of physical assets over others and introduce their own distortions. Corporate statutory rate reductions usually occurred with individual statutory rate reductions (1964 and 1986) . In fact, perhaps the only tax change in the post-war that directly addressed the corporate/noncorporate distortion was the 2003 dividend reduction, although even that change was not offi cially argued on the basis of efficiency gains but rather on the basis of the short-term objective of boosting the stock market and fairness (see Zuckerman (2003) ). Capital gains tax rates have also fallen over time, but not by very much because they were always subject to preferential treatment.
Another revenue reducing tax change that has occurred since the 1980s is the provision of generally available individual retirement accounts, as well as an expansion of individual accounts in employer plans. This approach-of exempting all returns from fi nancial assets at the individual level-probably did little to increase effi ciency. The most attractive types of investments to place in these accounts are the most heavily taxed at the individual (but not the corporate) level, namely interest bearing assets. But these reductions favor an already preferred form of investment-debt fi nance (whether in a corporate or noncorporate business).
While the effi ciency costs of the corporate income tax have been signifi cantly reduced in the last 50 years, the lack of focus on the effi ciency objective has caused a lot of revenue loss that may not have contributed a lot to these effi ciency gains. For example, the entire corporate/ noncorporate distortion could have been eliminated with a corporate integration proposal, which would have cost a fraction of the revenue loss from the lowering of tax rates and the granting of depreciation benefi ts across both sectors.
WHERE IS THE CORPORATE TAX HEADED?: TEMPORARY PROVISIONS 2001-2003
There are two legislative issue categories that might be examined to answer the question of what direction the corporate tax and capital income taxes will be headed in the future. At least one question that will presumably be resolved is whether the temporary provisions of 2001-2003 will be retained. Another is whether the current corporate tax bill will be enacted. I discuss these issues in the next two sections.
Three types of temporary changes have been enacted in 2001-2003 that affect the differences in tax treatment across investments: lower individual tax rates, lower rates on dividends and capital gains, and bonus depreciation.
How temporary is "temporary"? One might view the individual rate reductions enacted in 2001 as most likely to persist over time. These provisions were phased in over time and, as a result of a budget process rule, sunset after 2010. It is certainly the intent of the President and the majority party to make these rates permanent. There is perhaps less certainty attached to the dividend relief provision enacted in 2003, which reduced the tax rate on dividends to 15 percent from the normal individual tax rate, and also reduced the tax rate on capital gains to 15 percent. This reduction in tax rate on dividends and capital gains was the major reason for the reduction in the corporate total tax rate in Table 2 between 2002 and  2003 . Making these provisions permanent (along with the rate reductions enacted in 2001) was also in the President's budget proposals. Least likely to be made permanent, but certainly a possibility, is bonus depreciation. Bonus depreciation is restricted to equipment investment, but affects both corporate and noncorporate equipment. The provision was originally proposed explicitly as a temporary investment incentive, because temporary incentives should have a more powerful short-run effect. The administration did not propose to make it permanent (perhaps not surprising, as it originated in the Congress).
Were the changes in the 2001-2003 legislation beneficial in achieving effi ciency gains? These changes certainly reduced the overall effective tax rate on capital income (from 31 percent in 2000 to 23 percent in 2003). When holding the pre-tax return fi xed, the percentage reduction in the overall tax wedge is the same as the percentage reduction in the overall tax rate, so the reduction in the wedge is about 25 percent. But what about allocational effects? The answer is clearly mixed, because the tax changes alter many decision margins. In addition to affecting the difference between returns to corporate and noncorporate investment and the overall tax rate, they affect the tax rates on different types of assets within a fi rm (because bonus depreciation is only allowed for equipment). The provisions also affect the fi rm's debt-equity ratio and dividend payout choice (as well as the total tax burden as shown in Table 2 ).
Differential Tax Rates Across Asset Types
Recall that one of the objectives of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to tax the earnings from different types of capital investment more evenly. Before 1986, with the statutory corporate income tax rate at 46 percent, effective tax rates on earnings (taking into account depreciation and statutory tax rates but not debt fi nance) were less than ten percent for most equipment assets, while they were about 35 to 40 percent for buildings. After the 1986 act, the statutory rate was reduced to 34 percent, but depreciation was altered and the investment tax credit repealed. As a result, equipment tax rates were only slightly below the statutory rate (about 32 percent) and buildings slightly above it (still about 35 to 40 percent). (Oil and gas structure investments in drilling and exploration continued their favorable historical treatment.) These changes are also discussed in Mackie (2002) and Gravelle (2001) .
In the 17 years since the passage of the 1986 act, tax legislation and changes in inflation rates re-introduced a significant difference between tax burdens on earnings from investments in equipment and structures. This differential has been increased further by bonus depreciation. Legislative changes increased effective tax rates, especially for buildings. In 1993, the top corporate tax rate was increased by one percentage point, a relatively neutral change. The 1993 legislation also increased the useful life for non-residential buildings (commercial structures and some industrial structures) from 31.5 to 39 years. Although this change was large in terms of the write-off period, its effect on effective tax rates on earnings from the affected assets was relatively small, raising the tax rates of these assets by another percentage point (see Gravelle (2001) ). Tax rates on earnings for all assets fell, however, because of the decline in infl ation, which now averages around two percent but was projected to be around fi ve percent in 1986. The fall in infl ation rate reduced the effective tax rate on the return to short-lived assets much more than on long-lived assets and, thus, favors equipment. Thus, while the corporate rate increase in 1993 was relatively neutral, the depreciation change penalized buildings, and the drop in inflation, while benefi tting all assets, helped equipment and shorter-lived assets the most.
The resulting effective tax rates refl ecting permanent depreciation rules are shown in the second column of Tables  3 and 4. Table 3 shows that while some structures are taxed at rates slightly above the statutory rate, equipment is taxed at rates well below it. On average (see Table 4 ), equipment effective tax rates are only 26 percent, or about three quarters, of the statutory rate. Structures overall are taxed at 32 percent, but that average refl ects favorable treatment for mining, farm and public utility structures (the latter are generally treated as equipment in the tax law).
Tables 3 and 4 also illustrate the effects of the various levels of bonus depreciation. The 30 percent bonus depreciation reduces effective tax rates for equipment, on average, from 26 to 20 percent; the 50 percent bonus depreciation reduces the rate to 15 percent. Unlike incentives such as investment credits, bonus depreciation cannot reduce tax rates on equity investment below zero; 100 percent bonus depreciation leads to a zero rate.
Debt vs. Equity
Another important tax differential exists between the tax treatment of debt and equity, and can affect the fi rm's choice of fi nance. These differentials depend on tax rates at the individual level as well as the corporate tax rate. A fully debt-fi nanced investment's corporate tax is offset by the deduction of nominal interest, and the corporate level tax is usually negative because the fi rm can deduct investment subsidies as well as the infl ation premium. Positive tax liability arises through the individual tax on nominal interest. Equity-fi nanced investment is subject to the corporate tax, and the returns after corporate tax are subject to taxes on dividends and capital gains. These individual taxes are lower than the individual taxes on the return to debt-fi nanced investments Table 5 presents estimated effective tax rates on debt-fi nanced and equity-financed investments (a weighted average of equipment and structures refl ecting the capital stock shares of about two-thirds structures and one-third equipment) under a variety of scenarios. The fi rst four rows consider the case without tax favored In comparing tax rates with large discrepancies and particularly with negative rates, it is much more instructive to look at the tax wedge, Rt/(1 -t). Thus, under current law without considering pension effects, to be an attractive investment opportunity a debt-fi nanced return must exceed the after tax return by 19 percent (0.16/(1 -0.16)), while an equity-fi nanced return must exceed the after tax return by 82 percent (0.45/(1 -0.45)). The difference between the two is 63 percent of after tax return. The new rates (fi rst column of rates) of 11 and 39 percent reduce the difference to 52 percent which is a change of 11 percent (closing about one sixth of the gap). The effect of 50 percent bonus depreciation alone (ten and 40 percent) is a change of about seven percent. The combined change (four and 34 percent) is 15 percent.
If pensions and IRAs are taken into account, the differentials are smaller (in fact negligible for the individual rate changes). In the case of the debt-equity choice, it is quite important to consider that pension managers must allocate their assets between debt and equity. Thus, including pensions and IRAs seems more appropriate in this case than when looking at aggregate savings effects. The initial gap (between minus seven and 37 percent) is about the same, but the change (minus 13 and 34 percent) is two percent which closes about one thirtieth of the gap. The effect of bonus depreciation is about fi ve percent and the combined effects, about 11 percent. If the pension and IRA case is taken to be the most reasonable one, then there is a very minimal effect on the distortion between debt and equity due to individual rate changes not only because they benefi t both debt and equity but also because the changes are quite small. The effect of depreciation policy is a little larger. In addition, there is reason to believe that the substitutability between debt and equity is not large (see Gravelle (1994, p. 84) ), making reductions in this distortion less important than other reductions in any case.
Overall, therefore, the recent tax changes have probably done little to achieve efficiency gains through reducing the differential between debt and equity fi nance because some provisions benefi tted debt more than equity (marginal rate reductions) and some were available for both types of investment (bonus depreciation). Table 6 also presents effective marginal tax rates, in this case calculating the corporate and noncorporate sector rates (which can also be compared with rates on owner occupied housing, which are approximately zero). This table includes only equipment and structures (i.e., excludes inventory). As in the case of the debt vs. equity comparisons, some calculations take into account the lower individual tax rates for pensions and IRAs. Since these entities would not invest directly in unincorporated businesses (such as sole proprietorships and partnerships), the noncorporate numbers consider only the case when the providers of loans are not fully subject to tax. However, since noncorporate investment is not a viable alternative for passive investment entities such as pension plans, the more relevant measure may be the tax rates without incorporating these effects, since it is among taxable accounts that choices might be made about investing directly in businesses rather than fi nancial instruments.
Corporate and Noncorporate Sectors
This analysis suggests a reduction in the tax wedge between corporate and noncorporate investments of about one third for the rate changes and about two thirds for both rate changes and bonus depreciation. As discussed above, based on the data in Table 2 , the distortion between corporate and noncorporate investment fell by about 93 percent from 1953 to 2003; without the 2001-2003 changes the distortion would have fallen by only 81 percent. Similarly, the distortion between corporate-sector investment and owner-occupied housing would have fallen by about 28 percent with the rate reductions and about 54 percent with both rate reductions and bonus depreciation. Thus, without the changes, the wedge that existed in 1953 would have fallen by 76 percent rather than 88 percent. The effects are somewhat limited because the tax bill provided reductions for all four forms of investments: corporate debt, corporate equity, noncorporate debt, and noncorporate equity. All four forms of investment benefi t from bonus depreciation for equipment purchases. The dividend relief provisions (and slightly lower capital gains tax rates) benefi t corporate equity, but the lower individual tax rates benefi t corporate and noncorporate debt and noncorporate equity. Models of the corporate tax (see Gravelle (1994) for a discussion) suggest that distortions between corporate-and noncorporate-sector investments are signifi cant; thus, the narrowing of these distortions might be important.
Distortions of Payout Decisions
The dividend relief provision will signifi cantly reduce the favorable treatment of retained earnings by lowering the tax rate on dividends to the tax rate on capital gains. Under permanent law, the tax on a dollar of dividends was the individual's marginal tax rate which could be as high as 39.6 percent. The top tax on capital gains is fi xed at 20 percent (for those in the permanent 28 percent or higher brackets) and gains held for fi ve years were eventually to be taxed at 18 percent (under new rules adopted in 1997). However, the effective rate on gains is lowered because tax is This spread is greatly narrowed by the dividend relief provision, which lowers both rates to 15 percent. The effective tax rate on capital gains falls from nine to about seven percent, but the gap between the 15 percent dividend rate and the new seven percent rate is much smaller than the gap between the 28 to 39.6 percent rates and the nine percent rate in prior law. However, these preexisting distortions and the magnitude of the reduction due to the dividend rate would be reduced by half if the assets held in non-taxable accounts, such as pensions and IRAs, were included.
The recent changes, therefore, signifi cantly reduced the dividend payout distortions.
Summing Up
The changes introduced in 2001 and 2003 in the aggregate probably reduced tax distortions across investments, although the only provision that did so unambiguously was the dividend relief proposal. Individual rate reductions have the largest benefi ts for already favored forms of investment. Similarly, while bonus depreciation contributed to reducing the distortion between investment in the three sectors (corporate, noncorporate, and owner-occupied housing), it magnifi ed distortions between equipment and structures. The conclusion that dividend relief was the most important contributor to effi ciency gains depends, however, on accepting the traditional view of dividends where the dividend tax matters. If one subscribes to the "trapped-equity" (also called the "new") view, the dividend relief was simply a windfall and very little narrowing of these differentials occurred. (See Gravelle (1994) and Mackie (2002) for a discussion of the new view).
WHERE IS THE CORPORATE TAX HEADED: THE CORPORATE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS OF 2004
As a consequence of the World Trade Organization fi nding the U.S. provision reducing tax on income from exports (then termed the Foreign Sales Corporation provisions or FSC) to contravene rules against export subsidies, there has been an ongoing legislative effort to alter and fi nally to repeal the provision, (which is currently called the Extraterritorial Income Provision, or ETI). The ETI provision allows U.S. exporters to exclude between 15 and 30 percent of export income from tax, and also effectively allows some exclusion for income from foreign operations. The culmination of this process is current legislation that has passed the House and the Senate (in signifi cantly different forms) that goes well beyond the repeal of the ETI. There are several different parts to these proposals that relate specifi cally to the structure of the corporate tax: (1) the phase-out of the ETI provision, (2) introduction of a tax rate reduction for manufacturing, (3) anti-shelter provisions (that raise revenue), and (4) changes in the treatment of multinationals. There are other provisions in the bills that often arise when omnibus legislation is being considered, but these are the main ones.
The issues surrounding the repeal of the ETI provisions, particularly during a time when legislators were concerned about the manufacturing sector's employment growth, also sparked discussion of wider reforms to the corporate tax. This concern about manufacturing led to the development of a novel (and troubling) provision (included in both bills) to provide a special lower tax rate for manufacturing, as well as to some proposals to discourage investment abroad by currently taxing income from investments in foreign countries that produce goods for export either to other countries or back to the United States (the latter are often referred to as "runaway plants"). The proposal to increases taxes on foreign investment was made by Senator Kerry.
At the opposite end of the spectrum were discussions of abandoning any taxation of foreign-source income and moving to a territorial system. This topic is a perennial one that is often linked to discussions about how the role of the tax system is affecting the global "competitiveness" of U.S. fi rms-an issue that also arose whenever ETI provisions were discussed. While economists might be puzzled as to what international competitiveness for a country is supposed to mean, the topic is continually discussed and often linked to a territorial tax (see Olson (2003) for a speech with such a thrust by a Treasury offi cial).
Both tax bills contain a number of reductions in the tax on foreign-source income (although the incentive effects are not entirely clear). Several of the changes allow for more generous credits against U.S. tax for taxes paid to foreign countries. These credits are limited to the U.S. tax on foreign-source income. The most important of the changes as measured by revenue cost is a proposal to allow allocation of worldwide (rather than just domestic) interest to foreign and domestic income for purposes of determining foreign-source income. An important provision in the House bill would reduce the number of separate "baskets" for determining the foreign tax credit, which would effectively increase the ability of companies to cross credit, that is, to allow a credit for foreign taxes above the U.S. rate in one activity against the U.S. tax on income subject to lower foreign taxes in another activity. Other provisions affecting the foreign tax credit would provide more generous treatment of losses for purposes of determining the credit, more generous carryover and carryback rules (Senate bill), and more generous offsets against the alternative minimum tax. Several provisions relate to income earned by foreign subsidiaries that is eligible for tax deferral when retained abroad, including a temporary tax reduction to encourage repatriations and provisions to liberalize rules (Subpart F) that require certain types of income to be taxed currently, whether or not repatriated.
None of the provisions in these ETI bills is very large, in revenue terms, relative to the corporate tax. The single largest provision is the special tax rate for manufacturing. The Senate bill's provision would allow a nine percent deduction in taxable manufacturing income which would reduce the 35 percent top corporate rate to slightly under 32 percent for manufacturing. The revenue cost is about four percent of corporate revenues, based on comparing estimates of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to corporate receipts in the national income accounts. The House provision would set the top rate for manufacturing to 32 percent. If one examines the net change from providing a manufacturing provision that loses revenue with repeal of the ETI that gains revenue, the net revenue effect is smaller: the ETI provision is estimated by the JCT to offset about 55 percent of the cost of the manufacturer's rate reduction in the Senate bill and almost 80 percent in the House bill.
Directing a tax reduction at a particular industrial sector is novel, however. It may produce effi ciency losses, although those losses may not be more costly than the distortions imposed by the export subsidy, and there are some offsetting gains. For example, recalculating the tax rates with the taxable income deduction or lower rate, the manufacturing provision would reduce the marginal tax burden on manufacturing structures at the fi rm level by about three percentage points. The reduction for equipment would be smaller (about 2.5 percentage points with no bonus depreciation and about 1.5 percentage points with 50 percent bonus depreciation). Any rate reduction narrows the differential across assets within a fi rm. It also narrows the difference between the cost of debt and equity fi nance because debt actually benefi ts from higher corporate rates, both because the infl ation portion of the interest rate is deductible and because effective tax rates on earnings are smaller due to accelerated depreciation.
Normally, lower corporate tax rates would be a good method of reducing the corporate/noncorporate sector distortion, but these reductions will not matter very much. The Senate proposal provides deductions for unincorporated businesses. However, even when the benefi t is restricted to corporations, little is gained in terms of effi ciency. Under more realistic multi-sector models of the corporate tax, the greatest shifting possibilities are between the corporate and noncorporate forms within the same sector and, since there are negligible amounts of manufacturing in the unincorporated sector, little effi ciency gain would occur at this margin. When one adds to this effect the general distortion between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector, a loss seems quite possible even taking into account the gains from eliminating the export subsidy. Certainly a better revenue offset from an effi ciency perspective would have been an overall rate cut, even if it were only a percentage point.
Perhaps the more serious concerns about the manufacturing provision involve administration and compliance. In bills that contain extensive legislation to try to limit corporate tax shelters, especially in the Senate bill where these provisions amount to close to three percent of corporate tax revenues (revenues raised are only about half as much in the House bill), it is ironic that these bills contain a new provision, which will almost certainly complicate tax administration and create new opportunities to avoid tax by U.S. fi rms. A special subsidy for manufacturing creates two serious administrative and compliance problems: defi ning manufacturing and allocating income and deductions for firms that engage in non-manufacturing as well as manufacturing activities (which would include the numerous vertically integrated fi rms that engage in distribution, sales, and fi nancing as well as production). The legislation invites into the domestic economy all of the issues of transfer pricing and allocation of income that have so plagued the taxation of multinationals. These problems promise to be much more serious than the allocational rules associated with the ETI provision that is being eliminated. An earlier version of the House bill contained more manageable provisions (to allow accelerated depreciation of manufacturing equipment), but the rate cut for manufacturing became so popular so quickly that it ultimately replaced the House provision.
The anti-tax shelter provisions of the bills may relate less to physical investment choices and primarily address tax activities that are largely paper gains. The anti-shelter rules are numerous and complex, but the largest revenue gain is associated with leasing provisions between taxable U.S. fi rms and tax exempt (or "tax indifferent") entities including state and local as well as foreign governments. The Senate bill, which has more revenue raised through the anti-shelter rules, also gains some revenue from codifying and tightening the economic substance doctrine (guidelines for determining when a transaction is not allowed because it is motivated by tax reduction) and from taxes on inverted fi rms. Inverted fi rms are U.S. fi rms that switch their headquarters to a tax haven, often to take advantage of earnings stripping opportunities that allow a reduction of U.S.-source taxable income.
The provisions in the corporate tax bill that reduce taxes on foreign-source income of U.S. fi rms (through liberalizing the foreign tax credit and other provisions) while proposing anti-shelter provisions that raise such taxes are a smaller aspect of a general disagreement about the direction to move on the taxation of the income of multinationals. One thrust is to tax more of the income of foreign subsidiaries of multinationals. An example of such a proposal is that of Senator Kerry, who would currently tax income of U.S. fi rms operating in foreign countries for purposes of export (either back to the United States or to other countries). On the other hand, there is the continuing argument to abandon taxation of foreign-source income entirely (by moving to a territorial system where no foreign income is subject to U.S. tax), which is particularly hard to understand as a response to the loss of an export subsidy. Which direction the tax system should move in is an issue outside the scope of this paper (although see Gravelle (2004) and Grubert and Mutti (2001) for discussions; Grubert and Mutti (2001) propose a particular limited version of a territorial system that they claim is superior to the current system in both revenue levels and effi ciency).
But even within the international provisions contained in the corporate bill, the economic effects are not clear. They appear to benefi t foreign-source income. However, the largest provision in terms of revenue loss, allowing allocation of worldwide (not just domestic) interest for purposes of the foreign tax credit, may actually create incentives for domestic investment. Currently, only domestic interest is allocated between foreign and domestic income (and, because interest is a deduction, such an allocation reduces foreign-source taxable income and, therefore, reduces the foreign tax credit). The allocation is based on assets and, thus, creates a penalty for shifting assets abroad compared to a system with no allocation rules. Allocating an even larger amount of interest would only magnify that penalty for foreign investment (see Brumbaugh and Gravelle (1999) ). Some of the other international provisions, however, appear to encourage foreign investment. These provisions include reducing the number of foreign tax credit baskets, expanding carrybacks and carryforwards of the credit, allowing full credits against the alternative minimum tax, and relaxing the Subpart F tax haven rules.
One problem with the ETI repeal is that part of the revenue offset was designed to funnel some of the revenues back to the same fi rms that lost the export tax benefi ts-which may help to explain why both domestic manufacturing provisions (to aid exporting fi rms without operations abroad) and tax benefi ts for multinationals were contained in the same bills.
The message contained in the corporate tax bill is mixed and perhaps refl ects a lack of consensus on the direction that the corporate tax is headed. The bill seems to encourage both domestic and foreign investment. It has extensive provisions addressed at a variety of corporate tax shelters, while creating a new provision that invites abuse and complicated administration. While many observers are hopeful that the manufacturing rate cut will eventually be changed, the vision of whether the U.S. should move more towards a worldwide system (where all worldwide income is taxed) or more towards a territorial system (where only income earned in the U.S. is taxed) remains cloudy. tent with calculations in the TAXSIM model). Tax rates on dividends fall from 26 to 15 percent and the statutory tax rate on capital gains falls from 20 to 15 percent. One half of corporate stock is sold (and the remaining half held until death); the holding period is fi ve years. Half of fi nancial assets are held in tax exempt forms such as pensions and IRAs. 
